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Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior.
The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these
mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli:
grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions
performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the
grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions,
yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the
ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas—areas active during
the execution and the observation of an action—previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are
actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new
goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.
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Introduction
The ability to understand the intentions associated with the
actions of others is a fundamental component of social
behavior, and its deﬁcit is typically associated with socially
isolating mental diseases such as autism [1,2]. The neural
mechanisms underlying this ability are poorly understood.
Recently, the discovery of a special class of neurons in the
primate premotor cortex has provided some clues with
respect to such mechanisms. Mirror neurons are premotor
neurons that ﬁre when the monkey performs object-directed
actions such as grasping, tearing, manipulating, holding, but
also when the animal observes somebody else, either a
conspeciﬁc or a human experimenter, performing the same
class of actions [3,4,5]. In fact, even the sound of an action in
the dark activates these neurons [6,7]. In the macaque, two
major areas containing mirror neurons have been identiﬁed
so far, area F5 in the inferior frontal cortex and area PF/PFG
in the inferior parietal cortex [8]. Inferior frontal and
posterior parietal human areas with mirror properties have
also been described with different techniques in several labs
[9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21].
It was proposed early on that mirror neurons may provide
a neural mechanism for understanding the intentions of
other people [22]. The basic properties of mirror neurons,
however, could be interpreted more parsimoniously, such as
that mirror neurons provide a mechanism for recognizing the
observed motor acts (e.g., grasping, holding, bringing to the
mouth). The mirror neuron mechanism is, in fact, reminis-
cent of categorical perception [23,24]. For example, some
mirror neurons do not discriminate between stimuli of the
same category (i.e., the sight of different kinds of grasping
actions can activate the same neuron), but discriminate well
between actions belonging to different categories, even when
the observed actions share several visual features. These
properties seem to indicate an action recognition mechanism
(‘‘that’s a grasp’’) rather than an intention-coding mechanism.
Action recognition, however, has a special status with
respect to recognition, for instance, of objects or sounds.
Action implies a goal and an agent. Consequently, action
recognition implies the recognition of a goal, and, from
another perspective, the understanding of the agent’s in-
tentions. John sees Mary grasping an apple. By seeing her hand
moving toward the apple, he recognizes what she is doing
(‘‘that’s a grasp’’), but also that she wants to grasp the apple,
that is, her immediate, stimulus-linked ‘‘intention,’’ or goal.
More complex and interesting, however, is the problem of
whether the mirror neuron system also plays a role in coding
the global intention of the actor performing a given motor
act. Mary is grasping an apple. Why is she grasping it? Does
she want to eat it, or give it to her brother, or maybe throw it
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basis of intention understanding in this sense and, more
speciﬁcally, the role played by the human mirror neuron
system in this type of intention understanding. The term
‘‘intention’’ will be always used in this speciﬁc sense, to
indicate the ‘‘why’’ of an action.
An important clue for clarifying the intentions behind the
actions of others is given by the context in which these actions
areperformed.Thesameactiondoneintwodifferentcontexts
acquires different meanings and may reﬂect two different
intentions.Thus,whatweaimedtoinvestigatewaswhetherthe
observation of the same grasping action, either embedded in
contexts that cued the intention associated with the action or
in the absence of a context cueing the observer, elicited the
same or differential activity in mirror neuron areas for
grasping in the human brain. If the mirror neuron system
simply codes the type of observed action and its immediate
goal, then the activity in mirror neuron areas should not be
inﬂuenced by the presence or the absence of context. If, in
contrast, the mirror neuron system codes the global intention
associated with the observed action, then the presence of a
context that cues the observer should modulate activity in
mirror neuron areas. To test these competing hypotheses, we
studied normal volunteers using functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, which allows in vivo monitoring of brain
activity. We found that observing grasping actions embedded
in contexts yielded greater activity in mirror neuron areas in
the inferior frontal cortex than observing grasping actions in
the absence of contexts or while observing contexts only. This
suggeststhatthehuman mirrorneuronsystemdoesnotsimply
provide an action recognition mechanism, but also consti-
tutes a neural system for coding the intentions of others.
Results
Subjects watched three different types of movie clips (see
Figure 1): Context, Action, and Intention, interspersed with
periods of blank screen (rest condition). The Context
condition consisted of two scenes with three-dimensional
objects (a teapot, a mug, cookies, a jar, etc). The objects were
arranged either as just before having tea (the ‘‘drinking’’
context) or as just after having tea (the ‘‘cleaning’’ context).
The Action condition consisted of a hand grasping a cup in
the absence of a context on an objectless background. Two
types of grasping actions were shown in the same block an
equal number of times: a precision grip (the ﬁngers grasping
the cup handle) and a whole-hand prehension (the hand
grasping the cup body). In the Intention condition, the
grasping actions (also precision grip and whole-hand pre-
hension shown for an equal number of times) were embedded
in the two scenes used in the Context condition, the
‘‘drinking’’ context and the ‘‘cleaning’’ context (Figure 1).
Here, the context cued the intention behind the action. The
‘‘drinking’’ context suggested that the hand was grasping the
cup to drink. The ‘‘cleaning’’ context suggested that the hand
was grasping the cup to clean up. Thus, the Intention
condition contained information that allowed the under-
standing of intention, whereas the Action and Context
conditions did not (i.e., the Action condition was ambiguous,
and the Context condition did not contain any action).
Figure 2 displays the brain areas showing signiﬁcant signal
increase, indexing increased neural activity, for Action,
Context, and Intention, compared to rest. As expected, given
the complexity of the stimuli, large increases in neural activity
were observed in occipital, posterior temporal, parietal, and
frontal areas (especially robust in the premotor cortex) for
observation of the Action and Intention conditions.
Notably, the observation of the Intention and of the Action
clips compared to rest yielded signiﬁcant signal increase in
the parieto-frontal cortical circuit for grasping. This circuit is
known to be active during the observation, imitation, and
Figure 1. Six Images Taken from the Context, Action, and Intention Clips
The images are organized in three columns and two rows. Each
column corresponds to one of the experimental conditions. From left
to right: Context, Action, and Intention. In the Context condition
there were two types of clips, a ‘‘before tea’’ context (upper row) and
an ‘‘after tea’’ context (lower row). In the Action condition two types
of grips were displayed an equal number of times, a whole-hand
prehension (upper row) and a precision grip (lower row). In the
Intention condition there were two types of contexts surrounding a
grasping action. The ‘‘before tea’’ context suggested the intention of
drinking (upper row), and the ‘‘after tea’’ context suggested the
intention of cleaning (lower row). Whole-hand prehension (displayed
in the upper row of the Intention column) and precision grip
(displayed in the lower row of the Intention column) were presented
an equal number of times in the ‘‘drinking’’ Intention clip and the
‘‘cleaning’’ Intention clip.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.g001
Figure 2. Areas of Increased Signal for the Three Experimental
Conditions
Threshold of Z = 2.3 at voxel level and a cluster level corrected for
the whole brain at p , 0.05.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.g002
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Grasping Intentions with Mirror Neuronsexecution of ﬁnger movements (‘‘mirror neuron system’’)
[10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,25,26,27]. The observation
of the Context clip compared to rest yielded signal increases
in largely similar cortical areas, with the notable exceptions
of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) region and inferior
parietal lobule. The STS region is known to respond to
biological motion [28,29], and the absence of the grasping
action in the Context condition explains the lack of increased
signal in the STS. The lack of increased signal in the inferior
parietal lobule is also explained by the absence of an action in
the Context condition. Note that, in monkeys, inferior
parietal area PF/PFG contains mirror neurons for grasping
[8]. Thus, it is likely that the human homologue of PF/PFG is
activated by the sight of the grasping action in the Action and
Intention conditions, but not in the Context condition, where
the action is not presented. The Context condition activates
the inferior frontal areas for grasping, even though only
graspable objects—but no grasping actions—are shown. In
the monkey brain, ventral premotor area F5 contains, in
addition to mirror neurons, a population of cells called
canonical neurons [4]. These neurons ﬁre during the
execution of grasping actions as well as during the passive
observation of graspable objects, but not during the
observation of an action directed at the graspable object.
Neurons with these properties mediate the visuo-motor
transformations required by object-directed actions [30,31]
and are likely activated by the sight of the Context clips.
The critical question for this study was whether there are
signiﬁcant differences between the Intention condition and
the Action and Context conditions in areas known to have
mirror properties in the human brain. Figure 3 displays these
differences. The Intention condition yielded signiﬁcant signal
increases—compared to the Action condition—in visual
areas and in the right inferior frontal cortex, in the dorsal
part of the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus
(Figure 3, upper row). The increased activity in visual areas is
expected, given the presence of objects in the Intention
condition, but not in the Action condition. The increased
right inferior frontal activity is located in a frontal area
known to have mirror neuron properties, thus suggesting that
this cortical area does not simply provide an action
recognition mechanism (‘‘that’s a grasp’’) but rather it is
critical for understanding the intentions behind others’
actions.
To further test the functional properties of the signal
increase in inferior frontal cortex, we looked at signal
changes in the Intention condition minus the Context
condition (Figure 3, lower row). These signal increases were
most likely due to grasping neurons located in the inferior
parietal lobule, to neurons responding to biological motion
in the posterior part of the STS region, and to motion-
responsive neurons present in the MT/V5 complex. Most
importantly, signal increase was also found in right frontal
areas, including the same voxels—as conﬁrmed by masking
procedures—in inferior frontal cortex previously seen
activated in the comparison of the Intention condition versus
Action condition. Thus, the differential activation in inferior
frontal cortex observed in the Intention condition versus
Action condition, cannot be simply due to the presence of
objects in the Intention clips, given that the Context clips also
contain objects.
From the contrasts Intention–Action and Intention–Con-
text it is clear that the strongest activity in right inferior
frontal cortex is present in the Intention condition. This
could be due to two factors, not mutually exclusive: (1) a
summation of canonical and mirror neurons activity, and (2)
additional activation of mirror neurons of the inferior
frontal cortex that code the action the agent will most likely
make next. Because in the Intention clips the same action was
shown in two contexts (‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘cleaning’’), one can
test the intention-coding hypothesis by analyzing the signal
increase during observation of the Intention clips. A differ-
ential signal increase for the ‘‘drinking’’ Intention clip
compared to the ‘‘cleaning’’ Intention clip would indicate
neural activity speciﬁcally coding the intention of the agent.
This logic would hold only if there is no differential signal
increase in the ‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘cleaning’’ Context condi-
tions, when no action is displayed.
To test this hypothesis, we compared the signal change in
the inferior frontal area in the two Intention clips and the
two Context clips. The ‘‘drinking’’ Intention clip yielded a
much stronger response than the ‘‘cleaning’’ Intention clip (p
, 0.003; Figure 4). In contrast, no reliable difference was
observed between the ‘‘drinking’’ Context clip and the
‘‘cleaning’’ Context clip (p . 0.19). These ﬁndings clearly
show that coding intention activates a speciﬁc set of inferior
frontal cortex neurons and that this activation cannot be
attributed either to the grasping action (identical in both
‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘cleaning’’ Intention clips) or to the
surrounding objects, given that these objects produced
identical signal increase in the ‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘cleaning’’
Context clips, when no action was displayed.
Automaticity of the Human Mirror Neuron System
We also tested whether a top-down modulation of cognitive
strategy may affect the neural systems critical to intention
understanding. The 23 volunteers recruited for the experi-
ment received two different kinds of instructions. Eleven
participants were told to simply watch the movie clips
(Implicit task). Twelve participants were told to attend to
the displayed objects while watching the Context clips and to
attend to the type of grip while watching the Action clips.
These participants were also told to infer the intention of the
Figure 3. Signal Increases for Intention minus Action and Intention
minus Context
Threshold of Z = 2.3 at voxel level and a cluster level corrected for
the whole brain at p , 0.05. The black arrow indicates the only area
showing signal increase in both comparisons. The area is located in
the dorsal sector of pars opercularis, where mirror activity has been
repeatedly observed [10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,27]. See Tables
S1 and S2 for coordinates of local maxima.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.g003
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occurred in the Intention clips (Explicit task). After the
imaging experiment, participants were debriefed. All partic-
ipants had clearly attended to the stimuli and could answer
appropriately to questions regarding the movie clips. In
particular, all participants associated the intention of
drinking to the grasping action in the ‘‘during tea’’ Intention
clip, and the intention of cleaning up to the grasping action
in the ‘‘after tea’’ Intention clip, regardless of the type of
instruction received.
The two groups of participants that received the two types
of instructions had similar patterns of increased signal versus
rest for Action, Context, and Intention (see Figures S1 and
S2). The effect of task instructions is displayed in Figure 5. In
all conditions, participants that received the Explicit in-
structions had signal increases in the left frontal lobe, and, in
particular, in the mesial frontal and cingulate areas. This
signal increase is likely due to the greater effort required by
the Explicit instructions [32,33], rather than to understanding
the intentions behind the observed actions. In fact, partic-
ipants receiving either type of instructions understood the
intentions associated with the grasping action equally well.
Critically, the right inferior frontal cortex—the grasping
mirror neuron area that showed increased signal for
Intention compared to Action and Context—showed no
differences between participants receiving Explicit instruc-
tions and those receiving Implicit instructions. This suggests
that top-down inﬂuences are unlikely to modulate the activity
of mirror neuron areas. This lack of top-down inﬂuences is a
feature typical of automatic processing.
Discussion
The data of the present study suggest that the role of the
mirror neuron system in coding actions is more complex than
previously shown and extends from action recognition to the
coding of intentions. Experiments in monkeys demonstrated
that frontal and parietal mirror neurons code the ‘‘what’’ of
the observed action (e.g., ‘‘the hand grasps the cup’’) [4,6,8,34].
They did not address, however, the issue of whether these
neurons, or a subset of them, also code the ‘‘why’’ of an action
(e.g., ‘‘the hand grasps the cup in order to drink’’).
The ﬁndings of the present study showing increased
activity of the right inferior frontal cortex for the Intention
condition strongly suggest that this mirror neuron area
actively participates in understanding the intentions behind
the observed actions. If this area were only involved in action
understanding (the ‘‘what’’ of an action), a similar response
should have been observed in the inferior frontal cortex
while observing grasping actions, regardless of whether a
context surrounding the observed grasping action was
present or not.
Before accepting this conclusion, however, there are some
points that must be clariﬁed. First, one might argue that the
signal increase observed in the inferior frontal cortex was
simply due to detecting an action in any context. That is, it is
the complexity of observing an action embedded in a scene,
and not the coding of the intention behind actions, that
determined the signal increase. A second issue, closely related
to the ﬁrst one, is the issue of canonical neurons. These
neurons ﬁre at the sight of graspable objects. Because they are
also located in the inferior frontal cortex, one might be led to
conclude that the increased activity we observed in the
Intention clips was due to the presence of objects. Note,
however, that canonical neurons do not ﬁre at the sight of an
action directed to a graspable object, even though the object
is visible [35].
A strong argument against both these objections is that the
activity in inferior frontal cortex is reliably different between
‘‘drinking’’ Intention clips and ‘‘cleaning’’ Intention clips,
Figure 4. Time Series of the Inferior Frontal Area Showing Increased
Signal in the Comparisons Intention minus Action and Intention minus
Context
The drinking Intention condition yielded a much stronger response
than the cleaning Intention condition (p , 0.003), whereas no reliable
difference was observed between the drinking and cleaning Context
conditions (p . 0.19). The time series represents the average activity
for all subjects in all voxels reaching statistical threshold in the right
inferior frontal cortex.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.g004
Figure 5. Significant Signal Changes in Subjects Receiving Explicit
Instructions Compared to Subjects Receiving Implicit Instructions in the
Three Tasks Versus Rest
Threshold of Z = 2.3 at voxel level and a cluster level corrected for
the whole brain at p , 0.05. The two black arrows indicate two foci of
activity in dorsal premotor cortex that are located deep in the sulci
and thus not easily visible on the three-dimensional surface
rendering. See Tables S3–S5 for coordinates of local maxima.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.g005
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ditions. In contrast, no differences in activity in the inferior
frontal region were observed when ‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘clean-
ing’’ clips of the Context condition were compared. Thus, the
simple presence of an action embedded in a scene is not
sufﬁcient to explain the ﬁndings. Similarly, the sum of
canonical and mirror neurons cannot account for the
observed signal increase in the Intention condition, because
this increase should be identical for both ‘‘drinking’’ and
‘‘cleaning.’’ Because ‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘cleaning’’ contexts
determined different activations in the Intention condition,
it appears that there are sets of neurons in human inferior
frontal cortex that speciﬁcally code the ‘‘why’’ of the action
and respond differently to different intentions.
An important issue to consider in interpreting these data is
the relationship between the present results and the activity
of single neurons in the activated area. On the basis of our
current knowledge of physiological properties of the inferior
frontal cortex, the most parsimonious explanation of the
ﬁndings reported here is that mirror neurons are the likely
neurons driving the signal changes in our study. This
proposal needs, however, a clariﬁcation.
The characteristic property of most mirror neurons is the
congruence between their visual and motor properties. A
neuron discharging during the execution of grasping also ﬁres
during observation of grasping done by another individual.
This property cannot account for the present ﬁndings,
speciﬁcally, the differences in response observed between
the drinking and cleaning Intention clips. Our results suggest
that a subset of mirror neurons in the inferior frontal cortex
discharge in response to the motor acts that are most likely to
follow the observed one. In other words, in the Intention
condition, there is activation of classical mirror neurons, plus
activation of another set of neurons coding other potential
actions sequentially related to the observed one.
This interpretation of our ﬁndings implies that, in addition
to the classically described mirror neurons that ﬁre during the
execution and observation of the same motor act (e.g.,
observed and executed grasping), there are neurons that are
visually triggered by a given motor act (e.g., grasping
observation), but discharge during the execution not of the
same motor act, but of another act, functionally related to the
observed act (e.g., bringing to the mouth). Neurons of this type
have indeed been previously reported in F5 and referred to as
‘‘logically related’’ neurons [34]. In that previous study,
however, the role of these ‘‘logically related’’ mirror neurons
was never theoretically discussed and their functions re-
mained unclear. The present ﬁndings not only allow one to
attribute a functional role to these ‘‘logically related’’ mirror
neurons, but also suggest that they may be part of a chain of
neurons coding the intentions of other people’s actions.
What are the possible factors that selectively trigger these
‘‘logically related’’ mirror neurons? The most straightforward
interpretation of our results is that the selection of these
neurons is due to the observation of an action, also coded by
classical mirror neurons, in a context in which that action is
typically followed by a subsequent speciﬁc motor act. In other
words, observing an action carried out in a speciﬁc context
recalls the chain of motor acts that typically is carried out in
that context to actively achieve a goal.
Another possible explanation of how mirror neurons are
triggered can be related not only to the context, but also to
the way in which the action is performed. It is more common
to grasp the handle of the cup with a precision grip while
drinking, and to use a whole-hand prehension while cleaning
up. Thus, the grasp itself may convey information about the
intention behind the grasping action. Although this consid-
eration is very plausible, in general, there are reasons to
believe that it is unlikely that this mechanism played a role in
our study. First, in all presented grasping actions, when the
handle was on the same side of the approaching hand, the
grasp was always a precision grip, but when the handle was on
the opposite side of the approaching hand, the grasp was
always a whole-hand prehension. Thus, the hand always
adopted the type of grasp afforded by the orientation of the
cup, minimizing the impression that the type of grip would
reﬂect the intentional state of the agent. Second, this
hypothesis cannot explain the empirical data. In fact, in both
drinking and cleaning Intention clips there was always the
same number of precision grips and whole-hand prehensions.
However, as Figure 4 shows, the drinking Intention entailed a
much larger signal increase than the cleaning Intention.
Thus, the differential brain responses in the two Intention
clips cannot be explained by a possible meaning conveyed by
the grasp type, and cannot even be explained by a possible
‘‘compatibility effect’’ between grasp type and context type
(for instance, a whole-hand prehension in a context suggest-
ing cleaning).
The stronger activation of the inferior frontal cortex in the
‘‘drinking’’ as compared to the ‘‘cleaning’’ Intention con-
dition is consistent with our interpretation that a speciﬁc
chain of neurons coding a probable sequence of motor acts
underlies the coding of intention. There is no doubt that, of
these two actions, drinking is not only more common and
practiced, but also belongs to a more basic motor repertoire,
while cleaning is culturally acquired. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the chain of neurons coding the intention of
drinking is more easily recruited and more widely repre-
sented in the inferior frontal cortex than the chain of
neurons coding the intention of cleaning.
The conventional view on intention understanding is that
the description of an action and the interpretation of the
reason why that action is executed rely on largely different
mechanisms. In contrast, the present data show that the
intentions behind the actions of others can be recognized by
the motor system using a mirror mechanism. Mirror neurons
are thought to recognize the actions of others, by matching
the observed action onto its motor counterpart coded by the
same neurons. The present ﬁndings strongly suggest that
coding the intention associated with the actions of others is
based on the activation of a neuronal chain formed by mirror
neurons coding the observed motor act and by ‘‘logically
related’’ mirror neurons coding the motor acts that are most
likely to follow the observed one, in a given context. To
ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and
this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Through newspaper advertisements we recruited 23
right-handed participants, with a mean age of 26.3 6 6.3. Eleven
participants (six females) received Implicit instructions while 12
participants (nine females) received Explicit instructions. Partic-
ipants gave informed consent following the guidelines of the UCLA
Institutional Review Board. Handedness was determined by a
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[36]. All participants were screened to rule out medication use, a
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders, head trauma,
substance abuse, and other serious medical conditions.
Image acquisition. Images were acquired using a GE 3.0T MRI
scanner with an upgrade for echo-planar imaging (EPI) (Advanced
NMR Systems, Woburn, Massachusetts, United States). A two-dimen-
sional spin-echo image (TR = 4,000 ms, TE = 40 ms, 256 by 256, 4-
mm thick, 1-mm spacing) was acquired in the sagittal plane to allow
prescription of the slices to be obtained in the remaining sequences.
This sequence also ensured the absence of structural abnormalities in
the brain of the enrolled participants. For each participant, a high-
resolution structural T2-weighted EPI volume (spin-echo, TR = 4,000
ms, TE 54 ms, 128 by 128, 26 slices, 4-mm thick, 1-mm spacing) was
acquired coplanar with the functional scans. Four functional EPI
scans (gradient-echo, TR = 4,000 ms, TE = 25 ms, ﬂip angle = 90, 64
by 64, 26 slices, 4-mm thick, 1-mm spacing) were acquired, each for a
duration of 4 min and 36 s. Each functional scan covered the whole
brain and was composed of 69 brain volumes. The ﬁrst three volumes
were not included in the analyses owing to expected initial signal
instability in the functional scans. The remaining 66 volumes
corresponded to six 24-s rest periods (blank screen) and ﬁve 24-s
task periods (video clips). In each scan there were two Context clips
(during tea; after tea), one Action clip, and two Intention clips
(drinking; cleaning) (see next section). The order of presentation of
the clips was counterbalanced across scans and participants.
Stimuli and instructions. There were three different types of 24-s
video clips (Context, Action, and Intention). There were two types of
Context video clips. They both showed a scene with a series of three-
dimensional objects (a teapot, a mug, cookies, a jar, etc). The objects
were displayed either as just before having tea (‘‘drinking’’ context) or
as just after having had tea (‘‘cleaning’’ context). In the Action video
clip, a hand was shown grasping a cup in absence of a context on an
objectless background. The grasping action was either a precision
grip (the hand grasping the cup handle) or a whole-hand prehension
(the hand grasping the cup body). The two grips were intermixed in
the Action clip. There were two types of Intention video clips. They
presented the grasping action in the two Context conditions, the
‘‘drinking’’ and the ‘‘cleaning’’ contexts. Precision grip and whole-
hand prehension were intermixed in both ‘‘drinking’’ and ‘‘cleaning’’
Intention clips. A total of eight grasping actions were shown during
each Action clip and each Intention clip.
The participants receiving Implicit instructions were simply
instructed to watch the clips. The participants receiving Explicit
instructions were told to pay attention to the various objects
displayed in the Context clips, to pay attention to the type of grip
in the Action clip, and to try to ﬁgure out the intention motivating
the grasping action in the Context clips. All participants were
debriefed after the imaging session.
Data processing. GE image ﬁles were converted in Analyze ﬁles and
processed with FSL (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Brain volumes
within each fMRI run were motion corrected with Motion Correction
using the Oxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
of the Brain (FMRIB) Linear Image Registration Tool (MCFLIRT) [37].
Spatial smoothing was applied using a Gaussian-weighted kernel of 5
mm at full-width half-maximum, and data were high-pass ﬁltered
with sigma = 15.0 s and intensity normalized. Functional images were
ﬁrst registered to the co-planar high-resolution structural T2-
weighted EPI volume after non-brain structures had been removed
with FMRIB’s Brain Extraction Tool (BET) from the co-planar high-
resolution T2-weighted EPI volume [38]. The co-planar high-
resolution structural T2-weighted EPI volume was subsequently
registered to the Montreal Neurological Institute Talairach-compat-
ible MR atlas averaging 152 normal subjects using FMRIB’s Linear
Image Registration Tool (FLIRT) [37].
Statistical analyses. Data analyses were performed by modeling the
three conditions (Context, Action, and Intention) as stimulus func-
tions, applyingthe general linear model as implemented in FSL (http://
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Statistical analyses were carried out at three
levels: an individual-run level; a higher-order, multiple-runs individ-
ual-subject level; and a further higher-order intra- and inter-group
comparison level. Time-series statistical analyses were carried out
using FMRIB’s Improved Linear model (FILM) with local autocorrela-
tioncorrection [39].Higher-levelintra-and inter-group statisticswere
carried out using mixed effect (random effects) implemented in
FLAME (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) [40]. Z image
statisticswereperformedwithathresholdofZ=2.3atvoxellevelanda
clusterlevelcorrectedforthewholebrainatp,0.05[41,42].Thesignal
change displayed in Figure 4 was statistically analyzed with repeated
measures ANOVA and subsequent planned contrasts.
Supporting Information
Figure S1. Signiﬁcant Signal Changes in Subjects Receiving Implicit
Instructions for Each Task Versus Rest
With a threshold of Z = 2.3 at voxel level and a cluster level corrected
for the whole brain at p , 0.05.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.sg001 (1 MB JPG).
Figure S2. Signiﬁcant Signal Changes in Subjects Receiving Explicit
Instructions for Each Task Versus Rest
With a threshold of Z = 2.3 at voxel level and a cluster level corrected
for the whole brain at p , 0.05.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.sg002 (1.1 MB JPG).
Table S1. Intention minus Action
Local maxima in Talairach coordinates. Only the six local maxima
with highest Z score in each cluster are provided in the table. Cluster
size is in voxels. When the cluster encompasses more than one
anatomical location, the localization given corresponds to the local
maxima with the highest Z score.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.st001 (82 KB PDF).
Table S2. Intention minus Context
Local maxima in Talairach coordinates. Only the six local maxima
with highest Z score in each cluster are provided in the table. Cluster
size is in voxels. When the cluster encompasses more than one
anatomical location, the localization given corresponds to the local
maxima with the highest Z score. LH, left hemisphere; RH, right
hemisphere; TPO, temporo-parieto-occipital.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.st002 (82 KB PDF).
Table S3. Effect of Task Instructions: Explicit minus Implicit
Instruction, Action Versus Rest
Local maxima in Talairach coordinates. Only the six local maxima
with highest Z score in each cluster are provided in the table. Cluster
size is in voxels. When the cluster encompasses more than one
anatomical location, the localization given corresponds to the local
maxima with the highest Z score. SMA, supplementary motor area.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.st003 (82 KB PDF).
Table S4. Effect of Task Instructions: Explicit minus Implicit
Instruction, Context Versus Rest
Local maxima in Talairach coordinates. Only the six local maxima
with highest Z score in each cluster are provided in the table. Cluster
size is in voxels. When the cluster encompasses more than one
anatomical location, the localization given corresponds to the local
maxima with the highest Z score.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.st004 (82 KB PDF).
Table S5. Effect of Task Instructions: Explicit minus Implicit
Instruction, Intention Versus Rest
Local maxima in Talairach coordinates. Only the six local maxima
with highest Z score in each cluster are provided in the table. Cluster
size is in voxels. When the cluster encompasses more than one
anatomical location, the localization given corresponds to the local
maxima with the highest Z score. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex;
VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079.st005 (82 KB PDF).
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